MACOFS Military Maxims — Section 2: Land Warfare

Status: Canon (confirmed by creator) — full text preserved per archival standard. Previously excluded per an earlier creator policy holding the Maxims separate from the archive; that policy has since been reversed, and the full text is now archived here.

Source: books/macofs-military-maxims — see Reception & Publishing History, Forewords, Editor's Note & Introduction, and Perold Jonas.

MACOFS MILITARY MAXIMS PART TWO: MAXIMS OF LAND WARFARE (Reorganized in Conceptual Order by Category) ======================================================================

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES & GRAND STRATEGY

73) Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the aims of policy.

74) When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and the control of such direct action are termed "tactics."

5) While the military aim must remain subordinate to the political aim, governments, having gone to war, must respect the nature of war as a complex phenomenon, and not impose on their generals constraints that conflict with this nature.

18) Grand strategy has as an objective the bringing of an end to the war such that the subsequent peace is certain, effective and as long-lasting as possible. It may have, as an element, the conversion of enemies into allies.

17) The objective of strategy is to win the war in the least amount of time causing the least amount of disruption to society and the state, at a minimum adequate cost and causing the least amount of damage, death and destruction to equipment, men and the man-made and natural environments.

37) History shows that gaining the military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy.

24) In devising an army consider first its objectives; what will it be used for and how?

70) Military power is based on economic endurance.

29) Modern wars can be won or lost before fighting begins.

30) The greatest chance that war can be avoided is if everyone who would make war was brought to the conclusion that a war is unwinnable.

60) The idea, based on emotional conviction, that force must not be merely checked, but crushed by force, is a mirage that can only lead to mutual suicide.

22) The eventual risks of yielding to a threat are always greater than the immediate risks of standing up to such threats.

20) The essence of strategy is taking what the enemy holds dear. If you do not know who your enemy is, you cannot fight him, for you can't know what he treasures.

66) We may establish it as a principle, that if we can conquer all of our enemies by conquering one of them, the defeat of that one must be the aim of the war, because in that one we hit the common center of gravity of the whole war.

62) Mobility offers the means for fulfilling the true ideal of strategy; that of deciding the issue without a serious fight.

25) Discount any calculations based on numbers. History offers many examples of a numerically inferior force overcoming a severely superior force in numbers through use of superior means, whether tactics, strategy, weapon superiority, etc.

23) Offensive operations against the enemy's overseas territories may be effective to counter or forestall the danger of air or land attacks being launched against one's own territories.

69) A continental power's possession of overseas territories that are liable to be cut off tends to be a curb on her aggressive inclinations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL & POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF WAR

19) The true aim of war, rather than destruction, is paralysis. To insure this paralysis, actual damage is not necessary, the fear of it will suffice.

7) Break the will of the enemy to fight and you accomplish the true objective of war. Cover with ridicule the enemy's intentions. Exploit and aggravate the inherent frictions within the enemy country. Agitate the young against the old. Prevail if possible without armed conflict. The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles, the supreme excellence is to defeat the armies of your enemies without ever having to fight them.

8) Defeat the enemy's strategy, disentangle his alliances, separate the ruled from the rulers.

2) Inhibiting the opposing commander's response by swift and purposeful action is more likely to achieve a psychological victory than agonizing over what he is likely to do.

36) One strategy of war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy.

44) Psychological dislocation fundamentally springs from the sense of being trapped.

45) In order to achieve a strategic dislocation, it is often first necessary to distract the enemy by a move or series of moves.

46) The larger the force that is used effectively for distraction of the enemy, the greater is the chance of the concentration succeeding in its aim.

64) Velocity of attack and not the size of the forces engaged is nine-tenths of the battle, not that velocity physically destroys, but because it morally upsets.

68) It is an elementary principle of strategy that if you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, you should leave him a line of retreat -- as the quickest way of loosening his resistance. It should, equally, be a principle of policy, especially in war, to provide your opponent a ladder by which he can climb down.

72) Helplessness induces hopelessness. History attests that loss of hope, not loss of lives, is what decides the issue of war.

85) Helplessness and hopelessness produce paralysis. This is warfare of the most vicious kind for it works not against bodies but against minds. An enemy which reaches this point is totally open to any form of assault in whatever degree for he will be totally unable to resist you.

SURPRISE, DECEPTION & DISLOCATION

9) Speed creates its own surprise.

33) Mystify, mislead and surprise.

34) The purpose of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise.

35) Movement generates surprise and surprise gives impetus to movement. A movement which is accelerated or changes its direction inevitably carries with it a degree of surprise even though it be unconcealed.

71) Effective surprise can only be attained by a combination of many deceptive elements.

57) The art of secrecy is to be so open about 95% of a matter that the really secret 5% remains undetectable.

42) The enemy's equilibrium must be upset before a real attack is or can be successfully launched.

43) Dislocation is the aim of strategy. Dislocation in the physical or logistical sphere is the result of a move which A) upsets the enemy's dispositions and by compelling a sudden change of front dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces, B) separates his forces, C) endangers his supplies, D) menaces the route or routes by which he would retreat in case of need and reestablish himself in his base or homeland.

45) In order to achieve a strategic dislocation, it is often first necessary to distract the enemy by a move or series of moves.

46) The larger the force that is used effectively for distraction of the enemy, the greater is the chance of the concentration succeeding in its aim.

47) In order to hit with effect, the enemy must be taken off his guard. Effective concentration can only be achieved when the opposing forces are dispersed, and usually, in order to ensure this, one's own forces must be widely distributed.

38) When the enemy has obtained his objective, it has then necessary to immediately entice him forward with the intention of having him overreach and overstretch himself, thus causing the enemy to become destabilized. This intention can be attained by employing the method of elastic defense -- calculated withdrawal. Then, when the enemy's forces are stretched their greatest a tactical offensive should be initiated along the line of least expectation and at the point of least resistance.

41) Lure and trap -- elastic defense, tactical offensive; calculated withdrawal, strategy of defense.

39) In war, it is by compelling the enemy to make mistakes that the scales are most often turned.

50) You cannot hit the enemy with effect until you have first created the opportunity; you cannot make that effect decisive unless you can exploit the second opportunity that comes before he can recover.

51) Cutting Communications: In general, the nearer to the force a cut is made, the more immediate the effect; the nearer to the base, the greater the effect. In either case, the effect becomes muc greater and more quickly felt if made against a force that is in motion and in the course of carrying out an operation, than against a force that is stationary. In general, the longer the distance that has to be covered in cutting the enemy's communications -- i.e. lines of supply -- the greater the ratio of natural obstacles, but the less the ratio of opposition.

MANEUVER WARFARE & OPERATIONAL ART

1) Winning a battle is attained by seizing the initiative and holding it to battle's end. The initiative is most often successfully seized by maneuver. This is true whether one is defending or attacking or whether one is outnumbered or outnumbering.

6) The skill of moving troops rapidly, effectively and efficiently is one of the principle hallmarks of successful armies.

3) The ability and will to go where the enemy cannot, still more where the enemy thinks you cannot, is an immeasurable asset.

12) Ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

65) It is high mobility that time and time again that has proved superior to mere numerical strength.

62) Mobility offers the means for fulfilling the true ideal of strategy; that of deciding the issue without a serious fight.

64) Velocity of attack and not the size of the forces engaged is nine-tenths of the battle, not that velocity physically destroys, but because it morally upsets.

67) Decisive results come sooner from sudden shocks than from long drawn our pressure. Shocks throw the opponent off-balance. Pressure allows him time to adjust to it.

32) A small but highly trained force, striking "out of the blue" at a vital spot can produce a strategical effect out of all proportion to its slight number.

56) The best way to protecting one's flanks is by creating and extending a threat to the opponent's flanks.

91) Outflanking your opponent is the quickest means to success in combat. Attacking him at a point of least resistance, at a time or place or in a manner which he least expects helps to seal his defeat.

42) The enemy's equilibrium must be upset before a real attack is or can be successfully launched.

41) Lure and trap -- elastic defense, tactical offensive; calculated withdrawal, strategy of defense.

31) A withdrawal is most effective when immediately preceded by an offensive operation.

59) The time for a counterattack is not when an enemy has gained his objective, but when he has failed to gain it.

58) The best answer to a surprise penetration is to possess fully mechanized divisions which can be rushed to the scene for a rapid and powerful counterstrike. Infantry units would be of little value entailing a larger commitment and greater risk in maintenance and transport, nor would they be able to move forward rapidly to a scene nor would be very effective against armored units.

48) In order to ensure reaching an objective one should have alternative objectives.

49) A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.

TACTICAL PRINCIPLES & ENGAGEMENTS

21) Old styles of defense will prove fatal to a nation in face of a new method of attack.

10) The most virile nation might not be able to withstand another, inferior to it in all natural qualities, if the latter had some decisively superior technical appliance.

4) Any sizable concentration of enemy troops or forces is a target. Destroy it. Long range weapons; missiles or artillery, aviation or space-based or electromagnetic dimensional weapons should be used. Nuclear weapons are ideal for this purpose.

11) Mines are employed to force the enemy to canalize his forces, grouping them into lines or paths which have been pre-targeted by friendly forces to destroy the enemy.

13) Never use armor to penetrate a fortified position.

92) Direct attacks head-on to the enemy are always costly and usually ineffective. They should be avoided by all means.

93) Attacks on an enemy's fortified positions are often unnecessary to achieve the aim or objective of an operation. Idenfity other means of achieving the goal by outflanking, luring the enemy out, inducing paralysis in his fighting forces, attacks on unfortified or lightly fortified positions in his rear, etc.

56) The best way to protecting one's flanks is by creating and extending a threat to the opponent's flanks.

59) The time for a counterattack is not when an enemy has gained his objective, but when he has failed to gain it.

67) Decisive results come sooner from sudden shocks than from long drawn our pressure. Shocks throw the opponent off-balance. Pressure allows him time to adjust to it.

26) Be certain to establish a secure base before undertaking any operation.

27) It is always best to plan for the worst while hoping for the best.

94) The history of warfare shows that airpower alone is indecisive in combat.

LOGISTICS, SUSTAINMENT & MOBILITY

70) Military power is based on economic endurance.

86) The key to victory, especially in maneuver warfare, is logistics. A mobile force must be as self-sufficient as possible. It must be self-supplying, self-replenishing, self-repairing, et al. The greater the degree of self-sufficiency, the greater the forces' strategic value.

87) A force which cannot be supplied cannot win.

26) Be certain to establish a secure base before undertaking any operation.

40) Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than those of human resistance. By reasoned calculation and preparation natural hazards can be overcome almost to timetable.

27) It is always best to plan for the worst while hoping for the best.

63) Support to a threatened or holed-up neighbor is better achieved indirectly by pressure on the enemy elsewhere than by reinforcing him directly.

6) The skill of moving troops rapidly, effectively and efficiently is one of the principle hallmarks of successful armies.

65) It is high mobility that time and time again that has proved superior to mere numerical strength.

LEADERSHIP & COMMAND

82) The Qualities of a Leader a. The Human Touch - based on character, thoughts, loyalty, integrity, genuine interest in his men, judgement and delegation of responsibility. b. Intelligence -- a flexible intelligence. c. Courage -- physical and mental. d. Good Health -- physical and mental.

83) The good leaders know their people, their equipment and their weapons, as well as, if not better, than any other person under their command.

76) The Attributes of a Good General. a. Have a good chief of staff. b. Go for simplicity in everything. c. Cut out all paper and train subordinates to work on verbal instructions and orders. d. Keep a firm grip on basic fundamentals -- the things that actually work. e. Avoid being involved in details -- leave them to your staff. f. Study morale -- it is a big thing in war. Without high morale, you can achieve nothing. g. When the issue hangs in the balance, express confidence in the plans and operations, even if inwardly you feel not too certain of the outcome. h. Never worry. i. Never complain.

75) Never tell people how to do a thing. Tell them what needs to be done and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

77) Don't keep your troops in the dark. Keep them up to date on the situation. In a democratic army, first explain what must be done and why, then give the orders to do it.

55) Leadership: If you have to sack somebody, do it yourself. Send for him or go to see him and do it straight to his face and tell him why you have done it. Then push him straight out, put him in an airplane or transport and send him out of your army area. Do not leave it to other people and do not do it by letter. If a rebuke has to be given to a subordinate commander, even a small one, sign it yourself.

53) Leadership: If a man loses a battle or receives a setback, go and see him and find out why. If he did it because he was careless, if he did it because he was stupid or, above all, if he did it because he got cold feet, sack him. Tell him why you sacked him. But if he did it because he was a little too overeager, because he took just a little too much risk or because he was a little too pugnacious, give him another chance. Lots of fellows benefit a great deal by a little setback once.

54) Leadership: When you become a great general and you have all these publicity merchants rushing about, watch it that they do not make a monkey of you. Watch it that they don't make you act as they think you ought to act. If you start putting your cap on at a particular slant in front of the mirror before you go out to face the reporters, just watch it, because there has been more than one good man who has been a little bit ruined by trying to act up to what the publicity boys thought he ought to be. It may even affect your judgment.

78) The leader who is afraid to go up front, to go to the front, the leader afraid to take the same chances as his men, is never going to get anywhere at all. The man who tries to run any organization from his desk is going to be a complete failure.

52) Leadership: When you are a commander, one of the people you want to watch most closely is your opposite number, the fellow you are fighting, because battle is largely a struggle between will of the commanders.

79) Find an officer who will represent to you the mind of the enemy commander. They are very hard to find. They are very rarely regular officers -- they are usually university department heads, assistants or something like that. Get him and put him into your pocket because he is very useful.

80) It is not usually difficult for a commander to know what he wants to do; major tactics will be the basis of that knowledge. The thing that is difficult to know is if he can do it with the resources he has. Unless the commander has a wide knowledge of general administration and logistics, he will find himself too much in the hands of logistics experts who may be admirable, but who will be on the cautious side.

81) You're all right as long as you are winning. Everyone is a hell of a general whe they are winning. But it is when you are not winning -- it is then that the real test of leadership is made. It's a funny thing, but when you are in command and things have gone wrong there will always come a pause and your men stop and -- they look at you. It is rather an awful moment for the commander because he then knows that their courage is ebbing, their will is fading, and he has got to pull up out of himself the courage and the willpower that will stiffen them again and make them go on. That happens to every commande some time or another. He will never get over that moment unless he has the confidence of his men.

TRAINING, MORALE & HUMAN FACTORS

83) The good leaders know their people, their equipment and their weapons, as well as, if not better, than any other person under their command.

77) Don't keep your troops in the dark. Keep them up to date on the situation. In a democratic army, first explain what must be done and why, then give the orders to do it.

84) To build morale, develop a sense of showmanship. Develop a flair for showmanship. Allow your troops to break some minor rule which has no effect on their fighting ability. Don't enforce rules which interfere with morale simply because it is the "Army Way." Know which rules to break and which to maintain. If unsure, leave it in place.

72) Helplessness induces hopelessness. History attests that loss of hope, not loss of lives, is what decides the issue of war.

DOCTRINE, PLANNING & ORDERS

73) Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the aims of policy.

74) When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the disposition for and the control of such direct action are termed "tactics."

28) Orders should be written which identify the objective. The details as to how must be left to the recipient of the orders.

75) Never tell people how to do a thing. Tell them what needs to be done and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

48) In order to ensure reaching an objective one should have alternative objectives.

49) A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.

60) The idea, based on emotional conviction, that force must not be merely checked, but crushed by force, is a mirage that can only lead to mutual suicide.

61) No military commander has the right to dictate to the government what measure of force should be placed at his disposal. All military commanders are usurping their responsibility however, if they fail to make known to the government that the force assigned to him is inadequate for the task.

27) It is always best to plan for the worst while hoping for the best.

THEATER-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

16) River Crossings: In all opposed river crossings the determining factor is not the width of the river -- though this is important -- instead it is the length of river frontage to be held by the attacker. Should the front be extensive, by feinting here and there the would-be crosser can so distract his opponent that, sooner or later, he will be able to throw a bridge over the river at some unprotected or lightly held point and establish a bridgehead on the far side. Because a wide river will take longer to bridge than a narrow one, the wider the river the longer must be the operative stretch to feint on.

15) River Crossings: If a driver does not know where he is supposed to go after a crossing, send him into an assembly area established for that purpose in order to clear the road and get the problems straightened out.

14) River Crossings: Experience shows that if a vehicle is going to break down it will always do so in the middle of a bridge. Always maintain a recovery vehicle in readiness to move stalled or inoperative vehicles.

88) Desert Warfare: Maneuver is the essence and the key of desert warfare. A force in static positions is immobilized while the mobile force has the run of the desert.

89) Desert Warfare: In desert warfare, the possibility of outflanking an enemy's fortified positions is greatly enhanced. He cannot defende everywhere equally. Locate his vulnerable spot and hit him there.

90) Desert Warfare: Victory in desert warfare is determined at the operational level of combat.

94) The history of warfare shows that airpower alone is indecisive in combat.

TECHNOLOGY, FIREPOWER & FORCE COMPOSITION

70) Military power is based on economic endurance.

21) Old styles of defense will prove fatal to a nation in face of a new method of attack.

10) The most virile nation might not be able to withstand another, inferior to it in all natural qualities, if the latter had some decisively superior technical appliance.

11) Mines are employed to force the enemy to canalize his forces, grouping them into lines or paths which have been pre-targeted by friendly forces to destroy the enemy.

65) It is high mobility that time and time again that has proved superior to mere numerical strength.

64) Velocity of attack and not the size of the forces engaged is nine-tenths of the battle, not that velocity physically destroys, but because it morally upsets.