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MACOFS Military Maxims — Section 1: Space Warfare

Status: Canon (confirmed by creator) — full text preserved per archival standard. Previously excluded per an earlier creator policy holding the Maxims separate from the archive; that policy has since been reversed, and the full text is now archived here.

Source: books/macofs-military-maxims — see Reception & Publishing History, Forewords, Editor's Note & Introduction, and Perold Jonas.

MACOFS MILITARY MAXIMS PART ONE: MAXIMS OF SPACE WARFARE (Reorganized in Conceptual Order by Category) ======================================================================

  1. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES & THEORY OF STELLAR WARFARE
  1. A show of superior force is more likely to deter a starfleet battle than it is a ground or planet-based battle.
  1. Since the consequences of declining decisive battle are less immediate and less obvious in stellar warfare, the nation with an inferior space force is less likely to fight a battle. An encircling starfleet is less threatening to the jugular than an invading army. This has been true in planetary naval warfare when the weaker navy belongs to a continental power. If a maritime nation is threatened by a superior navy, it is destabilizing, leading to arms races in peacetime and bloody sea battles in wartime.
  1. A fleet may serve its purpose without engaging in decisive battle.
  1. It is the nature of stellar warfare that combat between space forces is fast-paced, deadly and decisive. Such combat is very expensive in terms of assets lost (men, equipment, ships). Space combat is more expensive and deadly than a comparable battle between wet navy fleets on a planet's surface.
  1. When an inferior force declines to give battle, a planetary assault may compel him to fight.
  1. Bring the firepower of the whole force into battle simultaneously.
  1. TACTICAL CONCENTRATION & FIREPOWER EMPLOYMENT
  1. It is the foremost responsibility of every battlefleet commander to concentrate forces and win battles with tactical skill.
  1. The essence of tactics is to employ forces to attain their full combat potential.
  1. The simultaneous concentration of a force's full combat potential against the enemy is the acme of tactical skill.
  1. Concentrate the firepower of one's force against a single objective, (i.e. target, ship, portion of a force, etc.) in order to destroy the enemy in detail. This is a necessity for an inferior force.
  1. If it takes two or more ships or repeated attacks to destroy an enemy ship, then the concentration of enough firepower surviving long enough is essential.
  1. In battle, the sheer number of units firing is more decisive and more effective than the quality of those units.
  1. Concentration of offensive firepower sufficient to win at one blow is always desirable. The decision to mass rests on the potential to enhance defense or to coordinate a concentrated first attack. If massing fails on either count, dispersal may be better than massing.
  1. An increase of "x" in firepower is worth more than a like increase in armor.
  1. If one's weighty weapons substantially outrange the enemy's then the aim is to stand outside of effective enemy range and bring down the force with sufficient concentration of force to destroy the enemy. If the enemy's weapons have superior range then the aim is to survive any blows with enough residual firepower to complete the mission.
  1. FLEET FORMATION, MANEUVER & TACTICAL CONFIGURATION
  1. In space, the preferred formation of the battle fleet is generally the globe, or globula formation, with the fleet's most vulnerable assets located in the center. Immediately surrounding the center are the fleet's most heavily armored (most survivable) ships. Ships with diminishing armor and firepower are arranged in expanding spheres about the center.
  1. Forces are massed in order to achieve a more effective defense with mutually supporting defense systems and in order to concentrate firepower against a single objective. If defenses are not mutually supportive, it may be more effective to disperse the attack -- attack from more than one direction -- different points of the compass -- IF firepower can be targeted against a single objective effectively.
  1. If one's command, control and communications are able to coordinate an offensive concentration of firepower over great distances then a broad-front attack is required. In certain circumstances related to scouting, intelligence capability or to weapon-range advantage or disadvantage, the broad-front attack may be wise even without the C3 to coordinate the attack. The broad-front attack, although sufficiently massed for mutual ship-to-ship defense when possible, requires the enemy to target each unit separately and independently while providing the targeting of the greatest number of weapons against the enemy. (See Maxim 11).
  1. If one's defenses are strong in comparison to the enemy's striking firepower, then massing of the fleet is necessary. If one's defenses are weak, then a dispersed force is indicated. (See Maxim 12).
  1. If the enemy is in possession of a weapon capable to inflict sudden and massive destruction then a sequential attack (a column formation) may be superior.
  1. ATTRITION, SURVIVABILITY & DAMAGE METRICS
  1. The object of battle is the destruction of the enemy's combat power. War in space is war by attrition. The secret of winning battles is to destroy the enemy's fighting ships while simultaneously providing adequate defensive cover for one's own.
  1. A weapon of such destructive firepower that it is capable of destroying a ship in one strike or hit is best defended against by preventing that weapon from hitting its target.
  1. A warcraft with great offensive firepower and little means of defense is very vulnerable and creates a highly unstable tactical situation. Such a craft depends for effectiveness on a first strike -- a stealth attack or a better scouting-weapon range combination. This sort of craft is a soloist.
  1. The weapon range that matters most is the productive range -- the range at which a telling number of weapons may be expected to hit their targets. The weapon range that matters for a battle force is the range at which enough weapons can be aimed and used with great effectiveness.
  1. Battle Formulas a. H = f/n -- d h = number of shots targeted on a ship minus the number of shots defeated, f = number of shots launched in one salvo, n = number of ships targeted, d = number of shots defeated by a ship's or fleet's defenses b. S = survivability = capacity to absorb hits c. C = counterforce = number of shots that can be defeated or survived before a firepower kill, c = s + d d. K = number of shots required to kill the target, k = c + 1 (base) Note: K is only a starting point. The firepower required to kill the enemy is always more than mere calculations indicate because battle is a dynamic affair. Be sure to throw in enough extra firepower to be certain of destroying the enemy. Ratios from the battlefield indicate that a ratio of three to one in terms of combat firepower to survivability is necessary to destroy the enemy in standard combat. A ratio of six to one is required when the enemy is heavily defended or possesses highly survivable assets. Note: k is only the starting point. The firepower required to kill the enemy is always more than mere calculations indicate because battle is a dynamic affair. Be sure to throw in enough firepower to be certain of destroying the enemy. MACOFS Military Maxims Part Two
  1. RECONNAISSANCE, ELECTRONIC WARFARE & INTELLIGENCE EFFECTS
  1. The trend toward a greater proportion of noncombatant personnel performing scouting, antiscouting and logistical roles at a remote distance from the battlezone will likely continue.
  1. Actions taken to interfere with the enemy's firepower, scouting and C-3 (command, control, communications) processes are also of fundamental importance.
  1. The possibility of tactical surprise has increased. Surprise may come from the enemy, from one's own forces or by chance.
  1. If the enemy's intelligence and/or sensory capacity is such that he will be certain of the fleets presence and its general location, then electronic warfare efforts should be designed not to conceal the presence of the fleet, but to complicate, to the greatest extent possible, the enemy's efforts to track and target the key units carrying the fleet's mission -- it's striking power.
  1. COMMAND, CONTROL, TRAINING & DECISION-TIMING
  1. As you train, so shall you fight.
  1. Training, wargaming, simulations, study and field practice are all necessary and effective procedures for training leaders for war, but there is no test for combat like combat.
  1. The untried commander should assume he has average skills and not presume he can overcome numerical disadvantages with skills he may not possess.
  1. Always be prepared to fight with what you have.
  1. Time and timing are the crucial elements. Time is duration, timing the point in time when the commander takes a proverbial deep breath and issues his tactical commands. Time is a quantity to save, timing is a moment of choice. It has often been said, "The difference between a good leader and a bad one is about ten seconds."
  1. WEAPONS CHARACTERISTICS & EMPLOYMENT CONSTRAINTS
  1. A weapon, the action of which cannot be repeated except at considerable intervals of time, and of which the supply is very limited, must be employed only under those conditions which assure a good chance of hitting.
  1. Historically, naval battles, at sea or space, have been fought without a reserve. The object has been to bring the full weight of offensive firepower to bear in a single pulse. Modern weapons may alter or amend this tactic, but the principle of offensive concentration of firepower still holds for all components that are not specifically intended for fighting by stealth or in solo operations. The principle reasons now are the decisiveness of the first effective blow and the cumulative benefit of an initial advantage in firepower.
  1. The best hope of victory is attained when all the combat units are in good position to strike and all support units are in good position to support. This is accomplished through maneuver exercised over a period of time.
  1. If the estimate is that the fleet cannot be safeguarded by its active defenses long enough for it to attack effectively, then the whole operation should be reevaluated.
  1. FORCE POSTURE, DETERRENCE & POLITICAL EFFECTS
  1. A show of superior force is more likely to deter a starfleet battle than it is a ground or planet-based battle.
  1. When an inferior force declines to give battle, a planetary assault may compel him to fight.
  1. OPERATIONAL PLANNING, RESERVES & SEQUENCING
  1. Fleet actions occur when some serious situation occurs which will eventually be intolerable if the weaker fleet does not come out to fight.
  1. Questions for Tactical Configuration Planning a. How much firepower would be sufficient to eliminate the threat b. Are defenses capable of mutual support or are they stand-alone? c. Are the forces assigned to the attack certain to survive long d. If a tactical reserve is established, is it near enough to enter
  1. Since the enemy can be expected to know about anything that has been practiced very much, complex fleet tactics must work even when the enemy is aware of them. Complex battle plans worked up in peacetime have a way of being reduced to their lowest common denominator in battle. Thus, complex battle plans are either a waste of time or provide experience in taking orders, close ship maneuvering, parade practice or discipline. They are not useful for battle.
  1. PRACTICAL RULES OF THUMB, DOCTRINE & WARGAMING
  1. In planning tactics, it is best to assume, with occasional exceptions, that there will be equal wit, valor, luck and perseverance on both sides. To base tactical success on outwitting, outmaneuvering or outfighting a first class enemy is the height of folly. You don't outfight a first class enemy. You outsurvive him. Attrition warfare is not about fighting, it is simply destruction. He who survives longest wins. (See Maxim 13)